# Responding to Advanced Adversaries

Anurag Khanna



## What will we talk about today?


- Advanced Adversaries/APTs/Nation State/State-nexus Targeted Attacks
- Phases of a state-nexus targeted attack
- Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) of Advanced Adversaries
- Responding to such intrusions

#### **Takeaway**: Understand a targeted attack and response to such attacks.

State-nexus intrusions are malicious cyberattacks that


- Originate from a particular country
- Adversaries working in interest of a State
- Well funded & resourced attacker with a purpose
- Often includes
  - cyber espionage,
  - destructive and disruptive attacks
  - currency generation to support regime

#### **Anatomy of Advanced Adversary**



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#### Anatomy of Advanced Adversary



Cyber espionage remains the primary motivation of state-nexus adversaries



#### LightBasin: A Roaming Threat to Telecommunications Companies

October 19, 2021 Jamie Harries and Dan Mayer From The Front Lines

networks via SSH and through previously established implants. CrowdStrike identified evidence of at least 13 telecommunication companies across the world compromised by LightBasin dating back to at least 2015

November 10, 2021 • 5 min read

The hunt for NOBELIUM, the most sophisticated nationstate attack in history



#### **Disruptive/Destructive Attacks**

Destructive attacks from state-nexus adversaries have happened and continue

Sony Pictures Attack, WannaCry, Ukraine power grid hack, NotPetya, DOS attacks Alert (AA22-187A)

> North Korean State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Use Maui Ransomware to Target the Healthcare and Public Health Sector

More



#### **Crypto Heist**

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Traditionally targeting of Banks to steal funds <u>"2016 - Bangladesh</u> <u>Bank cyber heist"</u>

Now Transformed into Crypto Heist

Alert (AA22-108A)




TraderTraitor: North Korean State-Sponsored APT Targets Blockchain Companies

Original release date: April 18, 2022 | Last revised: April 20, 2022



#### Anatomy of Advanced Adversary



#### **Covert Persistence - You do not see me!**

- Deeply embedded access focused on Operational Security
- Persistent methods to maintain long term covert access
- Backdoors and Implants
- Valid Credentials connecting over VPN
- Out of Band management software
  - AnyDesk, TeamViewer, ConnectWise
- Stealthier approaches, GoldenSAML, Golden Ticket, <u>ESXI based persistence</u>



Bad VIB(E)s Part One: Investigating Novel Malware Persistence Within ESXi Hypervisors ALEXANDER MARVI, JEREMY KOPPEN, TUFAIL AHMED, JONATHAN LEPORE SP 20 20 21 16 MINS READ



#### Web Shells


- Simple and effective
- Used as Initial vectors, deployed using vulnerabilities
  - ProxyShell, RCEs, Application Vulnerabilities
- Used as covert persistence mechanisms
  - Very difficult to detect
  - Require understanding the context





#### I come from No-Where- Reverse Proxy Tooling

- Used by Threat Actors to maintain covert access, by bypassing Firewalls
- Tools like Ngrok, SSH Clients (plink), fatedier can be used to perform tunneling





## **Credential Theft – dumping LSASS**

| 🙀 Task M<br>File Optic           | anager<br>ons View   |                     |   |         |      |   |                  | —             |                         | × |
|----------------------------------|--|---------------------|---|---------|------|---|------------------|---------------|-------------------------|---|
| Processes                        |  | App history         | Startup Users Detai   | ls Serv | ices |   |                  |               |                         |   |
| Name                             |  |                     | Status  |         |      | ~ | <b>3%</b><br>CPU | 35%<br>Memory | 0%<br>⊳ <sup>Disk</sup> |   |
| ocogle Crash Handler (32 bit)    |  |                     |   |         |      |   | 0%               | 0.4 MB        | 0 MB/s                  |   |
| S. (                             | ocal Security Au<br>Credential Mar<br>Security Accou<br>CNG Key Isolat | nager<br>nts Manage | Collapse<br>End task<br>Resource values<br>Create dump file | >       |      |   | 0%               | 5.6 MB        | 0 MB/s                  |   |
| > 🚱 Microsoft Distributed Transi |  |                     |   |         |      |   | 0%               | 2.2 MB        | 0 MB/s                  | > |
| Fewer details Properties         |  |                     |   |         |      |   |                  |               | End task                |   |


**Task Manager** 



C:\Tools>procdump -ma lsass.exe C:\tools\lsass.dmp .... [04:02:26] Dump 1 initiated: C:\tools\lsass1.dmp [04:02:26] Dump 1 writing: Estimated dump file size is 43 MB. [04:02:26] Dump 1 complete: 43 MB written in 0.1 seconds [04:02:26] Dump count reached.

**SysInternals Procdump** 





Dotnet Createdump


#### **Credential Theft - Keys to the Kingdom – Dumping NTDS.DIT**

C:\temp>powershell ntdsutil.exe 'ac i ntds' 'ifm' 'create full c:\temp\ntd' q q Copying registry files... Copying c:\temp\ntd\registry\SYSTEM Copying c:\temp\ntd\registry\SECURITY Snapshot {ddb1f6fa-a650-4f5b-b49e-074db672985e} unmounted. IFM media created successfully in c:\temp\ntd

Stealing NTDS.DIT



#### Anatomy of Advanced Adversary



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#### **Reconnaissance and Information Gathering**

- Nation State often spend considerable time gathering intelligence for their target – "Patience is a Virtue!"
- Willing to target victims over Social Networks to gain trust
- Identify vulnerabilities and novel techniques to exploit
- Exploit vulnerabilities and add persistence



#### **Knock- Knock - Initial Vector**

- Valid Credentials, Password Spraying (RDP, VPN...)
- Compromise Vulnerable internet facing systems
- Spear Phishing
- Supply Chains, Partners, Global offices

#### CrowdStrike Falcon Platform Identifies Supply Chain Attack via a Trojanized Comm100 Chat Installer



September 30, 2022 CrowdStrike Intelligence Team From The Front Lines Research & Threat Intel



Microsoft has released Customer Guidance for Reported Zero-day Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server<sup>®</sup>. According to the blog post "Microsoft is aware of limited targeted attacks using the two vulnerabilities to get into users' systems." The two vulnerabilities are CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082 affecting on premises Microsoft Exchange Server 2013, 2016, and 201

"Microsoft is aware of limited targeted attacks using the two vulnerabilities to get into users' systems."



#### I know you were Vulnerable last summer!

TLP:WHITE Product ID: AA2

April



APT Actors Exploit Vulnerabilities to Gain Initial Access for Future Attacks

#### Zoho ManageEngine Password Manager Zero-Day Gets a Fix, Amid Attacks

March 2, 2021 • 9 min read

HAFNIUM targeting Exchange Servers with 0-day exploits



Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities



#### **Multi Factor Authentication**

- MFA is the cost of doing business on the Internet.
- But MFA is not a a silver bullet
  - MFA Fatigue attacks
  - Accounts/Groups without MFA
  - Dormant account usage
  - Self-Enrollment process





#### **Gain the Control back**



## **Coordinated Remediation Event?**



Whac-A-Mole





Game-of-Chess




- 1. Gain Host based Visibility
- 2. Understand the Intrusion
- 3. Perform a Removal Event

But When to Eradicate?




## Timing is the key!

- Eradication timing is critical
- Best time to perform Eradication is
  - Post understanding attacker TTPs
  - Improvement of security Posture
  - Incident scoped



#### **Change All the Keys! – Enterprise-Wide Password Reset**

- 1. Perform KRBTGT (Kerberos account) Password reset
- 2. Execute Password reset for ALL accounts
  - Service Accounts
  - Privileged Accounts
  - User Accounts
- 3. Reset Directory Service Restore Mode Password Reset (DSRM) All DCs
- 4. Reset Domain Trust keys, Certificates for IDPs



#### **Change All the Keys! – Enterprise-Wide Password Reset**

- 5. Ensure MFA coverage
- 6. Network Devices
- 7. Reduce Computer account password rotation period
- 8. Reset Local Administrator Passwords for ALL endpoints
- 9. Reset Application Passwords



## What to do if you have an intruder ?

- Slow Down
  - Fast is not Fast Smooth is Fast!
- Stay Calm
- Create a Plan
  - External support
  - Improve visibility
  - Create eradication plan
- Execute it



#### **Take-Aways**

- Slow Down Stay Calm
  - Fast is not Fast Smooth is Fast!
- Make a plan and execute
- Visibility is the difference between a successful eradication and failed one
- Prepare for long haul



# Thanks for listening!

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